The Court of the EU Ruled That a National Court of Last Instance Can Consider a Case for Damages Caused by an Infringement of EU Law, in Which the Same National Court Has Also the Capacity of Defendant

By Judgement of 19 December 2024 on case C-369/23 upon request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union from the Supreme Administrative Court /SAC/ of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Court of the European Union ruled that the second subparagraph of Article 19 of the Treaty of the European Union and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which a court hears at last instance, in the context of an appeal on a point of law, a case, in which that court has the status of defendant, relating to the liability of the State for an alleged infringement of EU law on account of a judgment delivered by that court, provided that that national legislation and the measures taken to deal with that case are such as to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and impartiality of the court concerned.

As regards the requirement of independence and impartiality of judges, the Court recalls that the rules applicable to the status of judges and the performance of their duties must be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, in the form of instructions, but also types of influence which are more indirect and which are liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges concerned, and thus preclude a lack of appearance of independence or impartiality on their part likely to prejudice the trust which justice in a democratic society governed by the rule of law must inspire in individuals.

The Court notes that the remuneration and conditions of employment of the judges of the SAC are not dependent on the payment of any damages by that court. In those circumstances, the budgetary rules governing the payment of any damages resulting from the decision settling the dispute in the main proceedings are not such as to give rise to reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence or impartiality of those judges. The Court also points out that the mere fact that several judicial panels of the court hearing the case are successively responsible for cases concerning distinct legal issues arising from the same situation is not sufficient to give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the independence or impartiality of that court in each of those cases.