Saudi Arabia’s first dedicated supply chain finance framework has arrived in draft form from the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA), and it marks a decisive shift in how funders, arrangers and platforms will operate in the Kingdom. For the first time, activities that were previously conducted under general banking or financing permissions, factoring, reverse factoring and buyer-led programmes, face a purpose-built licensing perimeter, platform governance expectations, and anti-money-laundering obligations. Just as importantly, the draft signals a notable extra-territorial reach, capturing buyer-led programmes tied to the Kingdom even where the underlying suppliers sit abroad.
This article explains who is captured, what a licence requires, how platforms must be governed, the accounting consequences of reverse factoring, and the concrete steps providers and corporate treasurers should take during the consultation window.
SAMA has published draft Rules for Engaging in Supply Chain Finance (SCF) for public consultation, aiming to establish a dedicated regulatory regime where none previously existed. The proposals set out standards and procedures governing supply chain finance and supply chain finance intermediation activities, impose governance and reporting duties on the platforms that operate these programmes, and embed financial-crime controls throughout the onboarding and transaction lifecycle. The commercial significance is considerable: banks, fintechs and marketplaces that assumed their activities sat comfortably within existing permissions may now need a specific SCF authorisation. Because the rules remain in draft, the descriptions below reflect the proposals as published for consultation and may change before promulgation.
The five most important takeaways are:
SAMA has issued the draft for public consultation and invited market feedback within the stated consultation period. Interested parties should consult the official SAMA announcement for the precise submission deadline and channel, and treat the window as the primary opportunity to shape the final text before it is finalised.
The reach of Saudi Arabia’s first dedicated supply chain finance regime turns on how SAMA defines the regulated activities. The draft centres on supply chain finance as a set of financing techniques that optimise working capital across a trade relationship, including the discounting of receivables, the extension of early-payment facilities to suppliers, and buyer-led programmes in which an anchor buyer’s creditworthiness supports supplier financing. It also addresses supply chain finance intermediation: an activity in which an intermediary arranges or mediates financing between funders and suppliers without necessarily taking the credit onto its own balance sheet.
Understanding the perimeter is the first compliance task. Firms should test each activity they perform against the draft definitions rather than against the label they currently use commercially. A platform that describes itself as a “marketplace” may nonetheless be arranging financing in a way that requires authorisation, and a treasury vehicle that funds early payments to suppliers may be operating as a principal SCF provider.
The draft brings both factoring and reverse factoring within scope. Factoring, where a supplier sells its receivables to a funder at a discount for immediate liquidity, is a long-established technique now expressly addressed. Reverse factoring, also known as buyer-led supply chain finance, is where a buyer arranges for a funder to pay its suppliers early against approved invoices, with the buyer settling with the funder at the original due date. Because reverse factoring is anchored to the buyer’s credit and payment obligation, it raises distinct legal, prudential and accounting questions, which is why its explicit inclusion matters.
A typical captured arrangement would be a large Saudi corporate operating an approved-payables programme through a platform that pays suppliers within days of invoice approval.
Not every activity that touches a supply chain will be caught. Pure payment messaging, invoice presentment without any financing element, and technology facilitation that does not involve arranging or providing finance may sit outside the licensing perimeter. The test providers should apply is functional: does the activity involve providing financing, or arranging financing between a funder and a supplier? Where the answer is no, for example, a software vendor supplying reconciliation tooling with no role in the financing decision, the activity is more likely out of scope. Edge cases include hybrid platforms that combine messaging with optional financing modules; here, the financing module will likely bring the operator within scope even if the core product does not.
Firms operating close to the boundary should document their perimeter analysis and consider seeking clarification during the consultation.
The licensing architecture in the draft distinguishes two broad roles. The first is the party that provides funding and carries the resulting credit and liquidity risk. The second is the intermediary that mediates financing between funders and suppliers and does not typically take financing risk onto its own balance sheet. The distinction is expected to drive everything from capital expectations to the intensity of prudential supervision.
Both roles are expected to require authorisation, but the regulatory burden should differ. Principals should expect fuller prudential expectations reflecting the balance-sheet risk they carry, while intermediaries face a lighter regime focused on conduct, fitness and financial-crime controls. Neither, however, escapes governance and AML obligations. Firms should verify the precise licence categories and their conditions against the final text once published.
Applicants for a supply chain finance licence in Saudi Arabia should prepare for scrutiny across several dimensions. SAMA is expected to assess ownership structure and the suitability of controllers, apply fit-and-proper tests to directors and senior management, and require robust governance arrangements including board oversight and risk-management functions. Principals should anticipate minimum capital and liquidity policy expectations commensurate with the credit they will carry, whereas intermediaries must still demonstrate sound governance, client-money segregation and effective AML systems. The practical implication is that firms must build the organisational substance, people, policies, systems and controls, before, not after, they apply.
Where a new licensing perimeter is introduced over existing market activity, transitional arrangements are critical. Providers already conducting SCF business will want clarity on whether they may continue operating while an application is assessed, and how long any grace period will run. The consultation is the appropriate forum to request proportionate transitional relief, and firms should raise it explicitly if the draft leaves the position uncertain. Building an internal readiness timeline now, mapping the gap between current operations and the anticipated licence conditions, will reduce disruption once the final rules take effect.
The following table summarises the practical differences between the two roles, helping firms identify which authorisation is likely to fit their business model. The precise licence categories should be confirmed against SAMA’s final rules.
| Feature | Principal funder | Intermediary / arranger |
|---|---|---|
| Primary role | Provides funding / executes financing on balance sheet | Arranges/mediates financing between funders and suppliers |
| Licence required | Yes, authorisation as a funding provider | Yes, authorisation as an intermediary (lighter prudential regime) |
| Capital & prudential expectations | Higher / may require minimum capital and liquidity policies | Lower, but must meet fit-and-proper and AML controls |
| Risk on balance sheet | Yes, credit & liquidity risk | Limited, agency / facilitation risk |
| Typical providers | Banks, fintechs acting as funders | Marketplaces, platforms, brokers |
| Regulatory obligations | Full reporting, governance, AML, platform controls | Reporting, AML, segregation of client funds rules |
Because supply chain finance runs on platforms, governance of those platforms is central to the draft. SAMA is expected to require licensed entities to demonstrate effective board oversight, a documented risk-management framework, operational resilience, segregation of client funds, and compliance with applicable data-protection standards. In the Kingdom, data processing is also subject to the Personal Data Protection Law overseen by the Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA). These are not box-ticking exercises: they define whether a platform can be trusted to move funds between buyers, funders and suppliers reliably and lawfully.
A practical governance checklist for platform operators should include a clear accountability structure with named senior owners for key risks; a business-continuity and disaster-recovery plan tested against realistic scenarios; segregation and reconciliation of client and operational funds; a documented outsourcing and third-party risk policy; and a data-governance framework covering retention, access controls and cross-border data flows. Operational resilience expectations align with international guidance from bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements on payments infrastructure and market-infrastructure robustness.
At the technical level, platforms should ensure that application programming interfaces (APIs) connecting buyers, funders and suppliers are secure and version-controlled, that reconciliations between invoice approval, funding and settlement are automated and exception-flagged, and that robust audit trails record every material action. Regulators expect to be able to reconstruct the lifecycle of a transaction, from invoice approval to supplier payment to buyer settlement, from the platform’s records alone.
Licensed entities should expect periodic reporting obligations to SAMA covering exposures, transaction volumes, and financial-crime metrics. Firms should build reporting capability early, ensuring their data architecture can generate accurate returns without manual reconstruction. The best-prepared providers treat regulatory reporting as a design requirement of the platform rather than an afterthought bolted on before the first submission deadline.
Anti-money-laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist-financing (CTF) controls sit at the core of the draft. SAMA’s expectations map closely to Saudi Arabia’s Anti-Money Laundering Law and its implementing regulations, which were amended in 2026, and to international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which require risk-based customer due diligence, ongoing monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activity. For supply chain finance, the challenge is that a single programme may involve an anchor buyer, one or more funders, and a large, changing population of suppliers, each of whom must be understood from a financial-crime perspective.
Providers should align their onboarding, monitoring and screening frameworks with the SAMA draft, applicable Saudi AML law and FATF recommendations, and keep pace with any further amendments that affect KYC obligations. Because the draft embeds these controls at the licensing stage, weaknesses in a firm’s AML programme can jeopardise the authorisation itself.
Buyer-led programmes present a distinctive KYC challenge: the anchor buyer may onboard hundreds of suppliers, many of them located outside the Kingdom. Practical steps include applying a risk-based approach that calibrates due diligence to supplier jurisdiction and profile, verifying beneficial ownership of supplier entities, and relying on reputable third-party data where appropriate while retaining accountability. Foreign suppliers do not dilute the obligation, if anything, cross-border relationships heighten it, because sanctions and jurisdictional risk increase with geographic reach.
Platforms should screen all parties against sanctions and politically-exposed-person lists at onboarding and on an ongoing basis, monitor transactions for patterns inconsistent with expected behaviour, such as invoice values that diverge from historical norms or unusual timing, and maintain clear escalation paths for filing suspicious-transaction reports with the relevant Saudi authorities, principally the Saudi Financial Intelligence Unit. Automated monitoring calibrated to the specific typologies of trade and receivables finance will be far more effective than generic rules imported from retail banking.
Reverse factoring raises accounting questions that corporate treasurers must resolve well before a programme launches. The central issues concern whether a buyer should continue to present amounts owed to suppliers as trade payables or reclassify them as borrowings, whether a supplier may derecognise the receivable it has sold, and how credit impairment under IFRS 9 should be handled. These are matters governed by IFRS Accounting Standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board, principally IFRS 9 on financial instruments and IAS 32 on presentation, and by the disclosure requirements introduced for supplier finance arrangements. IFRS Accounting Standards are the applicable framework for many Saudi entities under the Saudi Organization for Chartered and Professional Accountants (SOCPA).
Getting this wrong has consequences beyond the accounts: mischaracterising a financing liability as an ordinary trade payable can distort leverage metrics and mislead investors and lenders. A disclosure checklist for treasurers should capture the terms of the programme, the extent of supplier participation, the effect on payment terms, and the balance outstanding under the arrangement.
The analysis typically hinges on whether the substance of the buyer’s obligation has changed. If entering the programme alters the nature of the liability, for example, by extending payment terms significantly beyond ordinary trade terms or by substituting a financial institution as the counterparty, the buyer may need to reclassify the payable as a borrowing. For suppliers, derecognition depends on whether substantially all the risks and rewards of the receivable, and control over it, have transferred to the funder. The risk-and-reward and control tests in IFRS drive the outcome.
Consider a Saudi buyer that operates an approved-payables programme where a bank pays suppliers early and the buyer settles at the original due date on standard commercial terms. Here the buyer may continue to present the amount as a trade payable, while the supplier, having sold the receivable without recourse, derecognises it and recognises cash. Contrast this with a programme where the buyer negotiates materially extended terms and the arrangement functions economically as bank borrowing: in that case, reclassification to financial liabilities and additional disclosure are likely required. The determinative factor is economic substance, not the programme’s label, and treasurers should document the judgment with reference to IFRS guidance.
One of the most consequential features of the draft regime is its territorial ambition. The draft’s triggers are expected to capture programmes where the buyer is established in the Kingdom or where the relevant activity is carried out in the Kingdom, meaning a buyer-led programme anchored to a Saudi corporate could fall within scope even where the participating suppliers, and potentially the funders, are located abroad. This potential extra-territorial reach has direct implications for international banks and fintechs that finance Saudi buyer programmes from offshore.
Foreign providers should not assume that operating from outside the Kingdom automatically keeps them beyond SAMA’s perimeter. Where a programme’s anchor is Saudi, the licensing and compliance analysis should be undertaken carefully, treating the activity as potentially in-scope pending confirmation against the final rules.
Global programmes touching the Kingdom may need contractual and operational adjustments. Providers should review programme documentation to identify Saudi nexus points, consider whether a Saudi licence or a locally licensed partner is required, and ensure AML, reporting and data-governance arrangements meet SAMA’s standards for the Saudi leg of the programme. Multinational treasurers running centralised payables programmes should map which supplier relationships and buyer entities create Saudi exposure and plan restructuring or authorisation accordingly.
The consultation window is a strategic opportunity, not merely a compliance formality. Firms that engage now can shape proportionate final rules and position themselves for a smooth authorisation. A staged action plan should proceed as follows:
A well-constructed consultation response combines legal argument with practical, technical clarification. Suggested points include:
Firms should assign an accountable owner for the consultation response, convene a cross-functional team spanning legal, compliance, treasury, finance and technology, and set internal deadlines that leave time for senior sign-off before the SAMA submission date. In parallel, begin the licence-readiness workstream so that authorisation is not delayed once the final rules are published. Resourcing this early is far less costly than remediation under time pressure after the regime takes effect.
The final shape of the rules is not yet fixed, and providers should prepare for a range of outcomes. It is reasonable to expect SAMA to weigh a stricter licensing approach against a more proportionate, activity-based regime, particularly for intermediaries and technology-adjacent operators. A plausible practical effect is a framework that draws a firm perimeter around genuine financing activity while offering some proportionality for pure facilitation. Firms should plan for the more demanding scenario, full prudential and AML expectations, because it is easier to scale back a robust programme than to build one under deadline. Engagement during consultation is generally the most effective way to influence how proportionately the final rules treat cross-border and intermediary models.
Saudi Arabia’s first dedicated supply chain finance regime, as proposed, establishes a licensing perimeter, platform-governance expectations, AML controls, and a notable cross-border reach that together could reshape how funders, arrangers and treasurers operate in the Kingdom. Three priority actions stand out: run a perimeter and gap analysis now to determine which licence class is likely to apply; build governance, AML and reporting substance before applying; and use the consultation to seek proportionate, clear final rules. For tailored counsel on licence strategy, platform governance or a consultation submission, contact Global Law Experts. This article is general information and not legal advice; contact us for tailored counsel.
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