Evidentiary Value of the Police Report in Cases of Personal Involvement of the Reporting Officer

Reflections on an Acquittal in the Court of Appeal of Dendermonde

By Attorney Hakan Husnu Erzurumlu

1. Introduction

The police report (proces-verbaal) occupies a central evidentiary role in Belgian traffic criminal law. Article 62 of the Road Traffic Act confers a special evidentiary weight on police reports prepared by competent officers, unless proven otherwise.[1] This statutory provision aims to reinforce the enforcement of traffic norms and to uphold the authority of objective police findings.[2]

However, this enhanced competence is not absolute. Jurisprudence traditionally limits it to personal and sensory observations made by the reporting officer in his capacity as a law enforcement official, concerning the constituent elements and circumstances of the offence.[3] Elements in a report that extend beyond such factual observations — including interpretations, subsequent information, or legal assessments — lose their enhanced evidentiary value and are instead treated as ordinary factual information subject to free judicial evaluation.[4]

A less explicitly articulated but doctrinally significant question concerns the status of the reporting officer as a precondition for the application of Article 62. Specifically: does a report retain its enhanced evidentiary value when the reporting officer is personally involved as a party or victim in the events he documents?

A recent decision of the Court of First Instance of East Flanders, Dendermonde Division, dated 11 February 2026, in which I acted as defence counsel, provides a clear and relevant answer.[5] The court ruled that a traffic report loses its enhanced evidentiary value when the reporting officer is personally involved in the events he documents. This article discusses the implications of this ruling within the framework of Belgian evidentiary law and the principles of fair criminal procedure.

2. Special Evidentiary Value of Police Reports in Traffic Cases

Article 62 of the Road Traffic Act provides that police reports prepared for enforcement purposes have probative force, unless rebutted.[6] This provision constitutes a deviation from the general rules of criminal procedure, under which the court assesses the probative value of all evidence freely.[7]

Case law has consistently restricted this special evidentiary value to direct sensory observations made by the officer at the time of or shortly after the incident. Post-hoc interpretations or legal qualifications are excluded from its scope.[8]

The rationale behind Article 62 is unambiguous: the legislature grants increased reliability to objective police findings carried out in the context of a neutral enforcement role. Accordingly, enhanced evidentiary value is functionally linked to the institutional capacity of the reporting officer as an impartial fact-finder.[9]

3. Personal Involvement of the Reporting Officer as a Limitation on Article 62

The impact of a reporting officer’s personal involvement on the evidentiary value of a police report has received limited doctrinal and jurisprudential attention, despite its central significance for the legitimacy of the statutory presumption.

When the reporting officer is directly involved as a party or victim in the events he documents, his role as a neutral observer is compromised. He becomes an active participant in the factual circumstances, generating tension between observation and involvement.[10]

From an evidentiary perspective, it may be argued that the enhanced probative value under Article 62 is justified only when the officer operates in a functionally neutral capacity. Personal involvement undermines this neutrality and eliminates the basis for the statutory evidentiary advantage.

4. The Judgment of 11 February 2026: Facts and Decision

In the case that gave rise to the judgment, in which I served as defence counsel, a driver was convicted in first instance of multiple traffic offences, including dangerous driving, excessive speed, and abrupt braking. The conviction rested predominantly on a police report prepared by a Chief Inspector of the Federal Road Police.[11]

The file revealed that the reporting officer himself was a participant in the traffic incident. He was riding a speed pedelec when the defendant’s vehicle overtook, merged in front of him, and braked sharply, compelling him to brake hard to avoid a collision. In a subsequent report, the officer explicitly identified himself as a “party/victim” and admitted that he shouted at the driver in a “human reaction.”[12]

The court concluded that the officer was personally involved in the events and ruled that the report did not possess enhanced evidentiary value under Article 62 of the Road Traffic Act. It retained only the status of ordinary factual information, subject to the court’s free assessment.

Because the defendant contested the facts and no other evidence was available, the court found that the allegations were unproven and acquitted the defendant of all charges.[13]

5. Analysis: Neutrality as an Implicit Condition for Enhanced Evidentiary Value

The judgment makes explicit what Article 62 implicitly assumes: the enhanced evidentiary value of a police report requires that the officer acts as a functionally neutral fact-finder.

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three stages:

1. Factual determination of personal involvement — decisive were not only the officer’s forced braking but also his self-description as victim and his emotional reaction.[14]

2. Consequences for evidentiary value — from this involvement, the court inferred the loss of enhanced probative force, implying that neutrality is a constitutive precondition.[15]

3. Application of general evidentiary rules — the report functions solely as ordinary information; in the presence of conflicting testimony without additional evidence, reasonable doubt arises, resulting in acquittal.[16]

The judgment illustrates how the degradation of a police report to ordinary evidence can directly influence a court’s assessment of facts.

6. Implications for Traffic Criminal Law and Evidence Law

The implications of this judgment extend beyond the individual case. It emphasizes that the special evidentiary value of police reports is functionally tied to the officer’s neutral enforcement role. Personal involvement undermines this neutrality and eliminates the statutory evidentiary advantage.

This has important consequences for situations in which law enforcement officers themselves are participants in traffic incidents they later document, such as overtaking maneuvers, confrontations, or near collisions. Courts must determine whether the officer can still be considered a neutral observer — a determination that affects the applicability of Article 62.[17]

The ruling also aligns with broader principles of criminal procedure, including the objectivity of investigative officers and the right to a fair trial. A statutory evidentiary presumption predicated on impartial observation is difficult to maintain when the observer is personally interested in the event.

7. Conclusion

The judgment of 11 February 2026 of the Court of First Instance of East Flanders, Dendermonde Division, clarifies the limits of Article 62 of the Road Traffic Act. It confirms that the enhanced evidentiary value of a police report ceases when the reporting officer is personally involved as a party or victim in the events. In such circumstances, the report retains only the status of ordinary evidence, subject to free judicial assessment.

This case explicitly links the special evidentiary value of police reports to the officer’s functional neutrality. Personal involvement disrupts this neutrality and deprives the report of its statutory evidentiary advantage. The ruling constitutes a significant doctrinal contribution to delineating the evidentiary weight of police findings in traffic criminal law and underscores the importance of objectivity in judicial fact-finding.

Footnotes 

1. Article 62 Belgian Road Traffic Act (Wegverkeerswet).

2. See Doctrine on probative value of police reports, e.g., [Author], Title, p. XX.

3. Cass. [case number], [date]; see also [Author], Book/Article, pp. XX–YY.

4. Ibid.; see also [Doctrine].

5. Court of First Instance East Flanders, Dendermonde Division, 11 Feb. 2026 (unpublished).

6. Article 62 Belgian Road Traffic Act.

7. See Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure, Article …; Cass. [case].

8. Cass. [case], [date].

9. [Doctrine], e.g., [Author], Title, p. XX.

10. Cf. Doctrine on objectivity of evidence.

11. Case file Dendermonde, prosecution’s evidence bundle.

12. Defendant’s trial record.

13. Court decision § X. 14–17. See supra §§ 5–6.