Our Expert in Finland
No results available
Financial assistance Finland Companies Act questions are surfacing more often in Finnish boardrooms as tighter financing conditions and renewed intra-group cash management force CFOs, general counsel and directors to test whether their proposed loans, guarantees and acquisition structures remain lawful in 2026. The Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act (Osakeyhtiölaki, 624/2006) governs when a company may lend to shareholders, guarantee a parent’s borrowings, or fund the purchase of its own shares, and it does so through a combination of a specific prohibition on assistance for acquiring the company’s own shares and general distribution rules built on solvency and balance-sheet tests, rather than a single blanket ban.
This guide maps the statutory framework to practical, decision-ready steps: what triggers the rules, which structures survive scrutiny, what documentation boards must assemble, and where personal liability begins. It is written for the people who actually approve these transactions and who carry the risk if the analysis is wrong.
Financial assistance Finland Companies Act compliance has moved from a niche legal concern to a live commercial issue. When credit is expensive, groups rely more heavily on internal financing: subsidiaries guarantee parent facilities, cash pools sweep liquidity upstream, and shareholders inject and withdraw funds through loans. Each of these moves interacts with Finnish capital maintenance rules, and each can expose directors if the company’s ability to pay its debts is compromised.
The core message of this guide is straightforward. Most intra-group financing in Finland is lawful, but only if it survives the applicable tests and is properly documented. The five compliance steps that matter most are: confirm there is genuine corporate benefit, run the balance-sheet (distributable funds) test, run the forward-looking solvency test, record a reasoned board resolution with supporting evidence, and retain the underlying agreements and financial models. Get those right and the transaction is defensible. Skip them and directors risk personal liability and the counterparty risks clawback. For a broader overview of Finnish corporate practice, see the Company Lawyer Finland 2026 (country/company guide).
This article was produced by Global Law Experts. For specialist advice on this topic, contact Jari Sotka at Attorneys-at-Law Sotka Lagal, a member of the Global Law Experts network.
The starting point for any financial assistance Finland Companies Act analysis is the statute itself. The Limited Liability Companies Act (624/2006) is the primary source of law on distributions, capital maintenance, shareholder loans and guarantees. It replaced the earlier 1978 Companies Act and is built around the principle that a company’s assets may only be transferred to shareholders through mechanisms the Act recognises, and only where the company remains able to meet its obligations.
Two authoritative texts should anchor every analysis. The consolidated Finnish-language version published on Finlex reflects all amendments in force and is the definitive wording for interpretation. An English translation is also published for reference, though where the Finnish and English diverge, the Finnish text prevails. Because the Act has been amended repeatedly since 2006, always confirm you are reading the current consolidated version rather than the original enactment, since financing rules and creditor-protection provisions have been refined over time. Note that the mandatory minimum share capital requirement for a private limited company was removed by amendment effective 1 July 2019, so many companies now have no restricted share capital at all.
The Companies Act does not operate in isolation. A guarantee or shareholder loan that looks acceptable under company law can still be challenged under insolvency law if the company later fails, the Act on the Recovery of Assets to Bankruptcy Estates allows a bankruptcy estate to unwind transactions that unfairly prejudiced creditors. Separately, where any party to the financing is a regulated entity, guidance from the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanssivalvonta / FIN-FSA) may bear on solvency and cross-border considerations. The Ministry of Justice publishes legislative history and explanatory material (including the government bill, HE 109/2005) that helps interpret the statutory tests. Treating these sources as a package, company law, insolvency law and, where relevant, financial supervision, is what separates a robust compliance process from a superficial one.
Under the financial assistance Finland Companies Act framework, the relevant concepts are broad. Finnish law captures any transfer of value, or the creation of any exposure, that benefits a shareholder or a related company at the company’s expense. That includes direct loans, the granting of security over the company’s assets, guarantees of another party’s debt, and, under the specific prohibition in the Act, loans, funds or security provided for the purpose of a third party acquiring shares in the company or its parent. The economic substance matters more than the label: a transaction structured as an “advance” or a “management fee” can still be treated as an unlawful distribution if it lacks a genuine commercial basis.
Not every intra-group transfer is problematic. A dividend paid in accordance with the Act’s distribution rules is lawful. A loan on genuine commercial terms, priced at arm’s length and documented, is generally permitted. The line is crossed when value moves to a shareholder without a lawful basis or without the company retaining the ability to meet its liabilities. Consider a borderline case: a subsidiary with modest retained earnings guarantees the full acquisition debt of its parent. If the guarantee dwarfs the subsidiary’s net assets and there is no realistic commercial return to the subsidiary, the transaction risks being characterised as an unlawful distribution, even though a guarantee, in principle, is permitted.
The financial assistance Finland Companies Act rules combine a specific prohibition on assistance for the acquisition of the company’s own shares with general distribution rules that require other transactions to pass tests before they proceed.
The Act contains a specific prohibition: a company may not give a loan, funds or security for the purpose of a third party acquiring shares in the company or its parent company. The practical effect is that classic “debt push-down” structures, where the target’s own assets secure the acquisition financing immediately on completion, must be handled with care and are often achieved only after a lawful reorganisation, such as a merger, that changes the legal position. This is a technical area where legal advice is essential; a structure that is common in other jurisdictions may not survive Finnish scrutiny without adaptation.
Several structures are routinely defensible when properly implemented:
None of these is a guaranteed safe harbour. Each depends on the numbers and the facts at the moment of the transaction, which is why the balance-sheet and solvency tests below sit at the centre of every analysis. Where a structure is finely balanced, treat legal review as mandatory rather than optional.
For distributions of value to shareholders, two tests decide whether the transaction is lawful. Both must be satisfied. Failing either renders the transaction an unlawful distribution and exposes both the recipient and the directors.
The balance-sheet (distributable funds) test asks whether the company has distributable funds. In broad terms, a company may only transfer value to shareholders out of unrestricted equity, retained earnings and other distributable reserves, not out of restricted capital. When assessing a guarantee or loan that functions as a distribution, the relevant question is whether the exposure, if it crystallised, would erode the company’s equity below the level the Act protects. Restricted capital cannot be used to fund shareholder benefits. In practice, finance teams model the company’s equity before and after the transaction and confirm that sufficient distributable headroom exists.
The solvency test is forward-looking. Even where distributable funds exist on paper, value cannot be transferred if it is known, or ought to be known, that the company is insolvent or that the transfer would cause insolvency, that is, an inability to pay its debts as they fall due. This requires directors to look forward, commonly over the next twelve months, and further where obligations are known to fall due later, and to stress-test against realistic downside scenarios: loss of a key customer, a delayed refinancing, a guarantee being called. The solvency test is where boards most often fall short, because it demands judgement about the future rather than a snapshot of the balance sheet.
Consider a subsidiary asked to guarantee €2 million of its parent’s borrowing.
| Item | Before guarantee (€) | After guarantee is called (€) |
|---|---|---|
| Total assets | 5,000,000 | 5,000,000 |
| Restricted capital (share capital) | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Distributable equity (retained earnings) | 1,200,000 | -800,000 |
| External liabilities | 3,300,000 | 5,300,000 |
| Liquid assets available in next 12 months | 900,000 | 900,000 |
Here the guarantee is €2 million but distributable equity is only €1.2 million. If the guarantee were called, distributable equity turns sharply negative and total liabilities exceed the buffer the balance-sheet test protects. To the extent the guarantee functions as a distribution, the transaction fails the distributable funds test on a called-guarantee basis, and with only €900,000 of near-term liquidity against a €2 million contingent call, it also raises serious solvency concerns. A defensible version would cap the guarantee well below distributable equity and demonstrate liquidity headroom against a called-guarantee scenario, alongside clear evidence of corporate benefit.
The two transactions that generate the most financial assistance Finland Companies Act questions are upstream guarantees and shareholder loans. Both are permitted in principle but carry distinct risks.
An upstream guarantee transfers risk from the parent to the subsidiary. The central legal requirement is corporate benefit (yhtiön etu): the subsidiary must receive a genuine advantage proportionate to the risk it assumes. Access to group-wide financing at a lower cost, or continued operational support that would not exist without the group facility, can constitute corporate benefit, but the board must evidence it, not merely assert it. The board process should include a written assessment of benefit, the balance-sheet and solvency analysis, and a resolution that records the directors’ reasoning. Where the guarantee is material relative to the subsidiary’s net assets, directors should consider whether shareholder approval is prudent even if the board could technically approve it. For a deeper treatment, see the planned guide on upstream and cross-stream security in Finland, corporate benefit checklist.
Shareholder loans in Finland are generally permitted where they rest on commercial terms and do not amount to an unlawful distribution. The key risk factors are pricing and priority. A loan at below-market interest, or with no realistic repayment schedule, edges towards being a disguised distribution. A loan that leaves the company undercapitalised or unable to meet its own creditors risks being unwound. Best practice is to price the loan at arm’s length, set a defined repayment schedule, take security where appropriate, and confirm the company retains sufficient liquidity for its own obligations. Note also that loans and security granted to shareholders and certain related parties must be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. Where the borrower is the controlling shareholder, the board should be especially rigorous, because the conflict of interest heightens scrutiny.
A useful sample sentence for a board solvency resolution reads: “Having reviewed the company’s most recent balance sheet and a cash-flow forecast covering the next twelve months, including stress scenarios in which the guarantee is called, the board resolves that the company has sufficient distributable funds and will remain able to meet its liabilities as they fall due, and accordingly approves the transaction.” A typical security package might comprise a pledge over shares, a business mortgage (yrityskiinnitys) and, where relevant, guarantees from other group members on a reciprocal basis.
A defensible financial assistance Finland Companies Act process is procedural as much as substantive. Who approves the transaction, and on what evidence, is often the difference between a lawful transaction and a liability.
Ordinary intra-group loans and guarantees fall within the board’s authority. However, where a transaction amounts to a distribution to shareholders, or where its scale materially affects the company’s capital position, the matter should be considered by shareholders, since decisions on distribution generally rest with the general meeting. Escalation is prudent whenever the exposure is large relative to net assets, whenever directors face a conflict of interest, or whenever the corporate benefit is uncertain. Shareholder approval does not cure a transaction that would render the company insolvent, no shareholder can authorise a distribution that leaves the company unable to pay its debts, but it removes doubt about internal authority.
Auditor involvement is not always legally mandatory for an intra-group guarantee, but auditor comfort or external financial evidence is prudent for material transactions and is commonly requested by lenders and boards alike. Whoever prepares the board pack should ensure it is complete before the meeting and that resolutions are recorded accurately.
When a financial assistance Finland Companies Act transaction breaches the rules, the consequences fall on both the recipient and the directors.
Value transferred as an unlawful distribution is recoverable under the Act, together with statutory interest, unless the recipient can show they neither knew nor should have known that the distribution was contrary to the Act. In insolvency, the picture sharpens: recovery and voidance rules allow a bankruptcy estate to unwind transactions that prejudiced creditors, so a guarantee or loan that looked defensible on the day may be challenged after the fact.
Directors who approve an unlawful distribution or a transaction in breach of the Act can be held personally liable for the resulting loss to the company, its shareholders or its creditors. Liability typically follows a breach of the general duty of care and loyalty or the specific capital-maintenance provisions. The defence, in practice, is process: a documented analysis of the tests, a reasoned solvency statement, and evidence of corporate benefit demonstrate that the directors acted with the diligence the law requires. For a fuller treatment, see the planned guide on director liability in Finnish company law. The principles of care and loyalty reflected here also align with international best practice on directors’ duties described in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
Once a company enters bankruptcy, control of these questions passes to the estate administrator, who will scrutinise recent related-party transactions. Guarantees called shortly before failure, loans to shareholders never repaid, and security granted on the eve of insolvency are all natural targets. Boards should assume that any material intra-group financing will be reviewed with hindsight, and should build their contemporaneous record accordingly.
The following table summarises how the three most common scenarios differ. It is interpretive guidance, not a substitute for analysis on the facts.
| Feature | Upstream guarantees | Shareholder loans | Unlawful distributions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allowed? | Conditional, must have corporate benefit and not amount to an unlawful distribution | Conditional, normally allowed if commercial and documented | Not allowed; subject to recovery |
| Key tests | Corporate benefit + distributable funds/solvency where it functions as a distribution | Commercial terms + solvency test | Distributable funds and/or solvency tests failed, or no lawful basis |
| Documentation | Guarantee agreement + board resolution + evidence of benefit | Loan agreement + pricing + repayment schedule + board resolution + disclosure in notes | Board minutes + correct accounting treatment (if remediated) |
| Director risk | Medium-high if steps not taken | Medium if undercapitalisation results | High, personal liability possible |
Use this ten-point checklist before approving any related-party financing:
Sample solvency statement: “The board confirms, on the basis of the balance sheet dated [date] and a twelve-month cash-flow forecast including stress scenarios, that the company has sufficient distributable funds for this transaction and will remain able to meet its liabilities as they fall due.”
Sample shareholder approval resolution: “The shareholders, having reviewed the board’s memorandum and solvency statement, approve the granting of the guarantee/loan described therein on the terms presented.”
The financial assistance Finland Companies Act regime is not a barrier to internal financing, it is a discipline. Most upstream guarantees and shareholder loans are lawful when they rest on genuine corporate benefit, satisfy the distributable funds and solvency requirements, and are recorded in a reasoned board resolution supported by a solid financial model. The transactions that go wrong are almost always the ones approved without that evidence, and assistance for the acquisition of a company’s own shares remains specifically prohibited. As financing conditions stay tight through 2026, boards that build a contemporaneous compliance file protect both the company and themselves.
The immediate next steps are practical: run the ten-point red-flag checklist against any pending transaction, commission the balance-sheet and solvency analysis, and confirm the corporate benefit before the board meets. Where a structure is finely balanced, particularly acquisition financing or a large upstream guarantee, engage counsel early rather than after the resolution is passed. For further reading, see the Company Lawyer Finland 2026 (country/company guide) and the profile of Jari Sotka, Finland company law specialist (author profile). Related guides on unlawful distribution of assets in Finland, upstream and cross-stream security, director liability, and acquisition financing in Finland complete the picture for teams building a compliant intra-group financing framework.
posted 4 minutes ago
posted 17 minutes ago
posted 25 minutes ago
posted 46 minutes ago
posted 1 hour ago
posted 1 hour ago
posted 2 hours ago
posted 2 hours ago
posted 3 hours ago
posted 3 hours ago
posted 3 hours ago
posted 4 hours ago
No results available
Find the right Legal Expert for your business
Send welcome message