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Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) represents a fundamental shift for anyone advising on Swiss and cross-border structures. Switzerland’s Federal Assembly adopted the Federal Act on the Transparency of Legal Entities and the Identification of Beneficial Owners (the Transparency of Legal Entities Act, TLEA) in 2024, and it is accompanied by a parallel set of anti-money laundering (AML) amendments. Together they introduce a central federal beneficial ownership register and extend due-diligence obligations to a wider group of advisers. Advisers should confirm the precise entry-into-force and transitional dates with the Federal Office of Justice and Fedlex, as implementation details and timing are set by federal ordinance.
The change is twin-track: one strand creates the register itself and defines who must be entered in it; the other strand recasts the professional obligations of the advisers who create, structure and administer entities. Corporate counsel, private client and family office advisers, foundation counsel and trustees all need to understand both strands. This guide sets out who is in scope, how the 25% beneficial-owner test applies to trusts and foundations, and what advisers should have in place before the regime goes live.
Understanding what Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means begins with the legislative architecture. Switzerland has historically lacked a single, central, non-public register of beneficial owners, relying instead on a patchwork of due-diligence obligations imposed on financial intermediaries and existing corporate record-keeping duties. That fragmented approach has drawn sustained international scrutiny, particularly from inter-governmental bodies focused on beneficial ownership transparency and the risk-based verification of ownership information.
The Transparency of Legal Entities Act establishes a federal, centrally administered beneficial ownership register in Switzerland. The register is to be administered under the auspices of the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ), consolidating beneficial-ownership information for a broad range of Swiss and certain foreign structures into a single federal system. Crucially, the register is not intended to be a public register: access is restricted to defined authorities and persons with a legitimate legal need, which distinguishes the Swiss model from fully public registers seen elsewhere.
The TLEA does not operate in isolation. It is accompanied by amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering Act that extend certain customer due diligence and reporting obligations to advisers who provide defined services, such as creating, managing and domiciling entities and structuring certain transactions. The combined effect is that the register captures the information, while the AML amendments impose on advisers the duty to identify, verify and monitor the persons behind the structures they serve. Advisers therefore feel the impact from both directions simultaneously.
Both the TLEA and the accompanying AML amendments are to enter into force on a date set by the Federal Council, with implementing ordinances to follow. Newly created entities become subject to registration obligations from entry into force, and existing structures benefit from a transitional period to bring their filings into line with the new requirements. Advisers should verify the current in-force date and transitional deadlines directly with the Federal Office of Justice or Fedlex, and should treat the entry-into-force date as the point from which both onboarding workflows and register submission processes must already be operational, not the point at which they begin building them.
One of the most practically important questions is which entities must register at all. The scope is deliberately broad, and part of what Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means for international advisers is that certain foreign structures are drawn into a Swiss registration obligation for the first time.
The register captures a wide range of entities governed by Swiss law. This includes:
The breadth is the point. Whereas the previous system left many entities outside any central beneficial-ownership record, the TLEA seeks broad coverage of Swiss-law entities.
Foreign companies are not automatically outside the regime. A foreign entity that operates through a Swiss branch can be brought within the registration obligation. This means an internationally headquartered group with a Swiss establishment cannot assume that its beneficial-ownership position is a purely foreign concern, the Swiss branch creates a domestic touchpoint that engages the register.
Beyond formal branches, a foreign entity whose effective place of management is in Switzerland can also fall within scope. This is a substance test: where the real day-to-day direction and decision-making of a foreign vehicle occur on Swiss soil, the entity may be treated as connected to Switzerland for registration purposes. Advisers structuring holding vehicles should scrutinise where board meetings, signing authority and strategic control actually sit, rather than relying on the place of incorporation alone.
The regime also reaches certain foreign entities that acquire or hold Swiss real estate. Land ownership creates a durable, high-value connection to Switzerland, and the interaction between the beneficial ownership register and Swiss land registries is a deliberate feature of the reforms. Foreign structures holding Swiss property should expect to be identifiable at beneficial-owner level.
At the heart of what Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means is the definition of who counts as a beneficial owner. The test combines a quantitative ownership threshold with a qualitative control test, so that persons who exert influence without holding a formal 25% stake are not able to hide behind the numbers. This aligns with the beneficial-owner concept already used in Swiss AML practice.
The primary threshold identifies as a beneficial owner any natural person who holds 25% or more of the capital or of the voting rights of an entity. The reference to a natural person is fundamental: the analysis must trace through corporate layers until it arrives at the individuals who ultimately own or control the structure. A corporate shareholder is never the end of the inquiry.
Ownership percentages alone do not capture every controller, so the definition also reaches persons who exercise control by other means. Illustrative examples include:
The test applies to indirect as well as direct holdings, which is where careful analysis matters most. Where an individual holds an interest through a chain of intermediate companies, the analysis must aggregate the individual’s ultimate proportional interest and assess control across the chain. For example, an individual who holds 60% of a top holding company, which in turn holds 50% of an operating entity, has an indirect economic interest that must be assessed against the threshold, while separately considering whether the individual’s control of the chain amounts to control of the operating entity by other means. Advisers should map full ownership trees and document the reasoning at each layer rather than stopping at the first corporate shareholder.
Applying a 25% capital-and-voting test to entities that have no shares and no shareholders is one of the most demanding aspects of the new regime. This is precisely why understanding what Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means for trusts and foundations requires a tailored analysis rather than a mechanical application of the percentage rule.
A private-law foundation (Stiftung) does not have owners in the conventional sense; it has a purpose, an endowment and a governing board. The beneficial-ownership analysis therefore focuses on the persons who exercise decisive influence over the foundation. Depending on the structure and governing documents, this can include the founder where they retain influence, members of the foundation board who hold decisive powers, and any controller who can direct or veto the foundation’s decisions. For foreign foundations that come within scope through a Swiss connection, the same substance-based enquiry applies: identify the natural persons with real control over the foundation’s assets and decisions.
For trusts, the analysis extends across the roles that make up the trust relationship. The trustee, who holds legal title and administers the trust, is a natural candidate for beneficial-owner status by virtue of control. A settlor who retains powers, and a protector or other office-holder with power to remove trustees, veto distributions or amend the trust, may also qualify as a controller. Where beneficiaries are identifiable and hold an interest at or above the relevant threshold, they too may fall within the definition. The practical rule is to assess every role that carries control or an identifiable economic entitlement.
Discretionary trusts present the hardest case because no beneficiary has a fixed entitlement. The recommended approach is to focus on control rather than on hypothetical percentages: identify the settlor’s retained powers, the trustee’s discretion, and any protector or controller powers, and document why particular individuals do or do not meet the control test. Where a class of beneficiaries is defined, advisers should record the classes and the mechanism for distributions, together with a reasoned assessment of whether any individual has become an identifiable beneficial owner in practice. Contemporaneous documentation of this reasoning is the best defence to any later challenge.
For many readers, the most consequential dimension of what Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means is the extension of AML obligations to certain advisers who previously sat outside the financial-intermediary regime. The amendments recast the professional duties of some of those who help build and run the structures the register is designed to illuminate. The precise scope, thresholds and any professional-privilege carve-outs are set in the Act and its implementing ordinances, which advisers should consult directly.
The amended AML Act is designed to reach advisers providing certain defined services rather than a specific professional title. Broadly, these may include those who create or manage entities, provide domiciliation services, and structure certain transactions. The focus is functional: if the service places the adviser at the point where ownership and control are arranged or moved, the adviser may be affected. Advisers should verify the final scope, and any exemptions for activities covered by legal professional privilege, against the enacted text.
Not every adviser is caught at every level of activity. The regime is expected to use activity and value thresholds to determine when an adviser becomes subject to full obligations. Because the specific figures are fixed by the Act and implementing ordinance and may be adjusted, advisers should confirm the current thresholds with the Federal Office of Justice or via Fedlex rather than relying on indicative numbers. In practice:
By way of illustration, a boutique adviser that structures a single large qualifying real-estate acquisition may be drawn into scope by that transaction alone, even if it handles few other matters. Conversely, a practice with many small mandates may be caught by a client-count or annual-volume test despite no single large deal. Advisers should monitor each applicable threshold on a rolling basis and confirm the exact figures against the current law.
Advisers within scope must carry out customer due diligence (CDD). The core obligations are to:
The adviser regime sits alongside the existing obligations of financial intermediaries. Where an adviser identifies indicators of money laundering or is unable to satisfy itself as to the identity of the client or beneficial owner, the appropriate response is to escalate internally and, where the threshold of suspicion is met, to make a report to the competent authority (in Switzerland, the Money Laundering Reporting Office, MROS), subject to any professional-privilege considerations. Best-practice guidance from inter-governmental bodies such as the FATF on the risk-based approach to beneficial ownership verification is a valuable reference point when calibrating how much verification a given relationship demands.
Knowing what Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means is only useful if it translates into operational readiness. The following checklist sets out the systems and documents affected advisers should have running before the regime goes live.
Every affected adviser should maintain a written AML manual that documents the firm’s approach. At a minimum it should cover the firm’s risk assessment methodology, the CDD steps required at each risk level, the beneficial-owner identification procedure (including the treatment of trusts and foundations), record-retention rules, the internal reporting and escalation path, and the roles responsible for compliance oversight.
Onboarding should follow a single, repeatable flow that captures identity, beneficial ownership and risk in one pass. A robust flow moves from client identification, to beneficial-owner capture using a structured form, to verification, to risk scoring, with clear stop-points where enhanced measures or senior sign-off are required before the relationship proceeds. Documenting the flow as a decision tree helps ensure consistent application of the 25%-and-control test across the team.
Advisers acting for entities within scope need a defined workflow for compiling beneficial-owner information and submitting it to the federal register within the applicable timelines, together with a process for keeping the entries current as ownership changes. Build in internal deadlines that comfortably precede the statutory ones, and assign clear ownership of each filing.
Because the register is non-public and beneficial-ownership data is sensitive, advisers must apply appropriate data-security controls to the information they hold. This includes access restrictions on a need-to-know basis, secure storage, audit trails of who accessed what and when, and disciplined retention and disposal aligned with record-keeping duties.
Finally, staff should be trained on the new obligations, the escalation route for suspicious activity should be tested rather than merely documented, and the firm should maintain audit logs demonstrating that its policies were followed in practice. Evidence of a functioning system is itself a mitigating factor if issues later arise.
| Topic | Before TLEA enters into force | After TLEA enters into force |
|---|---|---|
| Register | No federal non-public beneficial ownership register; reliance on financial-intermediary due diligence and existing corporate records | Federal, central non-public beneficial ownership register administered by the Federal Office of Justice |
| Scope | Many entities not centrally registered at beneficial-owner level; foreign-structure coverage uneven | A broad range of Swiss entities plus certain foreign entities (Swiss branch, effective place of management, Swiss real estate) |
| Adviser obligations | Many advisers outside financial-intermediary rules | Advisers who meet the statutory thresholds become subject to AML CDD and reporting requirements |
| Access to beneficial-owner data | Limited and fragmented | Restricted federal access for competent authorities and persons with a legal need, as defined in the Act |
| Sanctions | Case-by-case under existing law | Administrative measures and criminal penalties for breaches, as set out in the Act |
The regime is backed by enforcement, and appreciating what Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means includes taking the consequences of non-compliance seriously. The precise sanctions and monetary limits are set out in the Act; advisers should confirm the current figures against the enacted text.
The administrative toolkit is aimed at securing compliance and can include measures directed at the entity and its participants. In severe cases, the Act contemplates significant consequences for persistent non-compliance. Advisers should consult the Act for the specific administrative measures available.
The regime also provides for criminal fines for serious breaches, particularly where breaches are wilful. The applicable maximum fines are fixed by the Act and should be verified against the current statutory text rather than assumed. This exposure underlines the importance of accurate registration and diligent CDD.
Where a gap is identified, the sensible response is prompt remediation: correct or complete the register entry, document the corrective steps, and strengthen the underlying process to prevent recurrence. A demonstrable good-faith remediation effort, supported by contemporaneous records and functioning internal controls, is the best practical mitigation available to an adviser or entity that discovers a shortfall.
The reforms have direct consequences for cross-border planning, and advisers should revisit existing structures in light of the new connecting factors.
Estate plans that rely on foreign trusts or foundations with Swiss touchpoints should be reviewed to establish whether a Swiss branch, an effective place of management in Switzerland, or Swiss real estate holdings bring the structure within the register. The location of a foundation’s seat, the residence of trustees, and where management actually occurs all become relevant to the analysis. Structures that were previously invisible to any central Swiss record may now require registration.
Not every affected structure needs to be dismantled. In many cases the correct response is to document control accurately and register the beneficial owners, rather than to restructure. Restructuring should be considered where the analysis reveals genuine inefficiency or unintended exposure, but where the structure is legitimate and well-founded, thorough documentation of ownership and control, and timely registration, is the more proportionate route. The decision should turn on substance and purpose, not on avoiding transparency.
Switzerland’s beneficial ownership register (TLEA) means that, once in force, advisers face a coordinated set of obligations: a central federal register capturing a broad range of Swiss entities and certain foreign structures, and expanded AML duties for certain advisers who create, manage and structure them. The practical priorities are clear, map which of your clients’ structures are in scope, apply the 25%-and-control test rigorously to companies, trusts and foundations, confirm whether your own activity crosses the adviser thresholds, and have onboarding, register-submission and record-keeping workflows operating before entry into force rather than after it. Confirm the current in-force date, transitional deadlines, thresholds and sanction levels directly with the Federal Office of Justice and Fedlex.
Advisers who treat the intervening period as an implementation window, and who document their reasoning at every step, will be best placed to meet the requirements without disruption. Where a structure raises genuine complexity, particularly discretionary trusts and foundations with layered control, early specialist review is the surest way to arrive at a defensible position.
This article was produced by Global Law Experts. For specialist advice on this topic, contact Marie Flegbo-Berney at BONNARD LAWSON, a member of the Global Law Experts network.
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