Vietnam’s competition law amendments are reshaping merger control in one of Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing M&A markets. A draft amending Law on Competition, published for public consultation in June 2026, proposes material changes to filing thresholds, review timelines, remedies and penalty exposure for parties to economic concentrations, the Vietnamese statutory term for mergers, acquisitions and consolidations governed by the current Law on Competition (Law No. 23/2018/QH14). These proposals arrive on the heels of tightened enforcement guidance and higher penalties that already took effect in May 2026, meaning deal teams face increased compliance risk on live transactions right now.
This practical playbook explains what the draft changes, what already applies, and the concrete steps buyers and sellers should take at every deal phase to avoid enforcement action.
Yes, Vietnam has a comprehensive competition law framework. The governing statute is the Law on Competition (Law No. 23/2018/QH14), which took effect on 1 July 2019 and replaced the original 2004 Competition Law. Law 23/2018 regulates anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant or monopoly positions, and economic concentrations (merger control). Its implementing legislation, principally Decree 35/2020/ND-CP, sets out procedural rules, filing forms and review timelines for merger notifications.
The Vietnam Competition and Consumer Authority (VCCA), operating under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), is the primary enforcement body. The VCCA receives and reviews merger-control filings, conducts investigations into anti-competitive conduct, and issues decisions on whether economic concentrations may proceed, proceed with conditions, or be prohibited. The Vietnam Competition Council, a quasi-judicial body, handles appeals and adjudicates contested cases. Together, these institutions have progressively increased their enforcement activity since Law 23/2018 came into force, and early indications suggest the 2026 draft amendments are designed to give the VCCA even broader investigative and remedial powers.
Under Law 23/2018, economic concentrations include mergers, consolidations, acquisitions and joint ventures. A notification obligation is triggered when the parties’ combined total assets, total revenue or market share in the relevant Vietnamese market meets prescribed thresholds set out in Decree 35/2020/ND-CP. Transactions that do not meet any threshold may proceed without filing. However, the VCCA retains authority to investigate any concentration that may substantially lessen competition, regardless of whether thresholds are met, a residual power that the draft competition law Vietnam proposals seek to expand significantly.
The draft amending law, circulated for public comment in June 2026 via the National Assembly’s legislative programme, proposes changes across five key areas. Each has direct implications for M&A deal structuring, timeline planning and contractual risk allocation.
The draft proposes to recalibrate notification thresholds downward and to introduce additional alternative triggers. Industry observers expect the practical effect to be a substantial increase in the number of transactions that require pre-closing notification to the VCCA. Key proposed changes include:
Practical impact: Buyers should re-run threshold analyses on all pending and pipeline transactions using the proposed new figures. Deals previously structured as non-notifiable may now require filing under the draft merger filing Vietnam rules.
The draft introduces a broader concept of “control” that captures not only voting-right majorities but also the ability to exercise decisive influence through contractual arrangements, board-appointment rights, veto powers over strategic decisions or coordinated conduct among investors acting in concert. This is particularly significant for private equity sponsors that use consortium or club-deal structures and for joint-venture arrangements where indirect control is exercised through shareholder agreements rather than direct equity ownership.
The VCCA’s proposed expanded powers include the authority to extend Phase II review periods, to request additional information from third parties (customers, competitors and suppliers), and to conduct dawn-raid-style inspections where there are reasonable grounds to suspect gun-jumping or incomplete disclosure. The draft also contemplates the power to impose interim measures, effectively a “stop the clock” mechanism, during the review period.
Under the current regime, the VCCA may approve, conditionally approve or prohibit an economic concentration. The draft law proposes to formalise and expand the menu of available remedies to include binding behavioural commitments (such as access-to-infrastructure obligations, pricing controls and non-discrimination undertakings) alongside traditional structural remedies (divestiture). Industry observers expect this to bring Vietnam’s remedies framework closer to international standards, but also to increase the complexity and duration of conditional-approval negotiations.
The draft includes provisions that would allow the VCCA to review transactions that completed within a prescribed period before the amending law takes effect, where those transactions were not notified under the current regime but would have been notifiable under the revised thresholds. This look-back power, if enacted in its current form, creates significant retroactivity risk for deals that closed without a filing in the period between announcement of the draft and its final enactment. Deal teams should document their threshold analysis for any recent transaction to demonstrate good-faith compliance with the rules in force at the time of closing.
The following table summarises the key differences between the current merger control Vietnam regime and the proposed changes under the June–July 2026 draft, together with the practical impact for M&A transactions.
| Area | Current Regime (Law 23/2018 + Decree 35/2020) | Proposed Draft Changes (June–July 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Filing thresholds | Based on combined total assets, total revenue or market share as set out in Decree 35/2020/ND-CP | Lower asset/revenue thresholds plus new transaction-value alternative trigger; minority-stake acquisitions captured |
| Definition of control | Voting-right majority or ability to appoint majority of management | Broader concept including decisive influence via contracts, veto rights, concert-party arrangements |
| Review timeline | Phase I: 30 days; Phase II: up to 90 days (extendable in limited circumstances) | Phase II extended; new “stop the clock” power for information requests; potential for longer overall review |
| Remedies | Structural (divestiture) and limited conditions | Expanded menu: formal behavioural commitments, access obligations, pricing controls added |
| Look-back / retroactivity | No general retroactive review power | Proposed authority to review recently completed non-notified transactions |
| Penalties for non-notification | Fines as prescribed under Law 23/2018 and sanctioning decrees | Increased fines; May 2026 guidance already tightening enforcement; officer liability proposed |
The combined effect of lower thresholds, broader definitions of control and extended review periods means that deal teams should build additional time into transaction timetables. Where a straightforward Phase I clearance might previously have been obtained within 30 days, the likely practical effect of the draft amendments is that complex transactions, particularly those involving state-owned enterprises, concentrated markets or foreign acquirers, may face total review periods of four to six months or longer. Long-stop dates in sale-and-purchase agreements should be calibrated accordingly.
The tightened penalty framework is not merely prospective. Enforcement guidance issued by the VCCA in May 2026 already increases the practical risk of sanctions for failure to notify or for gun-jumping, completing or implementing a notifiable transaction before obtaining clearance. The draft competition law amendments Vietnam proposes to formalise this heightened enforcement posture in statute.
Gun-jumping in Vietnam encompasses two broad categories of conduct:
Common examples include exercising board-appointment rights before clearance, sharing competitively sensitive pricing or customer information during due diligence without appropriate clean-team protocols, and issuing joint commercial communications or integrating sales forces before the VCCA decision.
While the VCCA has historically pursued relatively few formal gun-jumping cases, academic analysis of Vietnam’s enforcement trajectory suggests that the regulator has been building institutional capacity and investigative resources since 2020 with a view to more active enforcement. The May 2026 guidance, which clarifies the VCCA’s approach to calculating fines and assessing aggravating factors, is widely seen as a precursor to a more assertive enforcement programme. Early indications suggest the VCCA is reviewing a number of transactions that closed in 2025 and early 2026 without notification, particularly in the technology and financial-services sectors.
The draft proposes to increase monetary penalties for non-notification and gun-jumping, with fines calculated as a percentage of the parties’ total revenue in the relevant market. Crucially, the draft also introduces the concept of individual officer liability, meaning that directors, legal representatives and compliance officers could face personal sanctions for authorising or failing to prevent a gun-jumping violation. This represents a significant escalation of risk and should prompt immediate review of compliance governance within acquirer organisations.
Deal teams should not wait for the draft to be enacted. The combination of already-effective penalty guidance and proposed statutory changes means that compliance action is needed at every transaction phase.
The competition law amendments Vietnam proposals affect sellers as much as buyers. Sellers face disclosure obligations, potential liability exposure and, critically, the risk that a deal fails to close due to regulatory delay or prohibition, tying up assets and management attention for months.
Where a deal is subject to post-closing behavioural remedies, sellers should negotiate for full payment of the purchase price at closing, resisting holdbacks or escrow arrangements linked to the buyer’s future compliance with VCCA conditions. If an escrow is unavoidable, insist on a defined release schedule, objective release triggers and interest accrual on escrowed amounts. Indemnity obligations related to pre-closing competition-law compliance should be capped and time-limited.
Certain sectors face heightened merger control risk under the competition law amendments Vietnam framework due to market concentration, regulatory overlap or state involvement.
Transactions involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or equitised former SOEs require particular care. The VCCA may apply heightened scrutiny where the acquirer would gain control of assets previously held by the state, and the draft amendments include provisions that could require approval from the relevant state-ownership authority in addition to VCCA clearance. Deal teams should identify SOE involvement at the earliest stage and factor in additional approval timelines.
The following model clauses are provided as starting points for deal teams. All drafting should be reviewed and adapted by qualified Vietnamese competition-law counsel.
“Each Party shall cooperate fully and in good faith with the other Party in preparing and filing all notifications, submissions and responses required under the Law on Competition of Vietnam, and shall use its reasonable best efforts to obtain clearance from the Vietnam Competition and Consumer Authority as promptly as practicable.”
“From the date of this Agreement until Closing (or earlier termination), neither Party shall, and each Party shall procure that its Affiliates shall not, take any action that would constitute implementation of the Transaction prior to the receipt of merger-control clearance from the VCCA, including without limitation exercising any voting rights, appointing or removing any directors, or integrating any commercial operations of the Target.”
“Completion of the Transaction is conditional upon the VCCA issuing a decision approving the economic concentration (or the expiry of the statutory review period without the VCCA having issued a prohibition decision). If VCCA clearance has not been obtained by the Long-Stop Date, either Party may terminate this Agreement by written notice to the other.”
| Date | Event | Practical Impact for M&A Deals |
|---|---|---|
| May 2026 | New enforcement guidance and tightened penalties began applying | Immediate increase in enforcement risk, review live deals for gun-jumping exposure |
| June 2026 | Draft Competition Law amendments published for public consultation | Potential changes to filing triggers and remedies, re-scope due diligence and filing strategy |
| July 2026 | Public commentary period and follow-up guidance expected | Monitor technical clarifications, adjust deal clauses if final text deviates from draft |
| TBD (expected late 2026–early 2027) | Expected final law and implementing decrees | Changes will be binding, update compliance programmes and post-closing integration plans |
The competition law amendments Vietnam is advancing through the June–July 2026 draft represent the most significant overhaul of merger control since Law 23/2018 took effect. With tightened penalties already in force and broader filing obligations on the horizon, every M&A deal with Vietnam exposure requires a fresh compliance review, whether the transaction is at the LOI stage, in due diligence or approaching closing. Buyers and sellers who act now to adjust threshold analyses, strengthen contractual protections and build regulatory timelines into deal planning will be best positioned to navigate the new regime without delay or penalty.
For specialist guidance on merger filing strategy, gun-jumping risk mitigation or deal structuring in Vietnam, consult a qualified Vietnam M&A lawyer with direct competition-authority experience.
This article was produced by Global Law Experts. For specialist advice on this topic, contact Ngan Nguyen at VILAF, a member of the Global Law Experts network.
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