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From 1 January 2026, Australia’s mandatory, suspensory merger notification regime fundamentally changed the way deal teams structure and document joint ventures. Any party forming, expanding or restructuring a joint venture agreement in Australia must now assess whether the transaction triggers a mandatory notification to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), and must wait for clearance before completing. The ACCC’s updated merger reform FAQs, published on 24 April 2026, clarified key procedural questions around thresholds, review windows and waiver mechanics, yet significant drafting risks remain for in-house counsel and advisers who have not recalibrated their standard JV precedents.
This guide provides a clause-by-clause drafting checklist that maps JV governance structures directly to ACCC merger control risk, equipping general counsel, CFOs, private equity sponsors and developer deal teams with the practical tools they need right now.
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Under the ACCC’s mandatory merger notification regime, certain acquisitions of shares, assets or rights must be notified before completion. A joint venture can constitute a notifiable acquisition when the formation, restructuring or transfer of interests gives one party decisive influence or control over the JV entity or its assets, and the relevant turnover or transaction-value thresholds are met. The ACCC’s thresholds guidance confirms that combined Australian turnover, transaction value and asset value are the primary metrics for determining whether notification is mandatory.
In competition law terms, the formation of a joint venture can be treated as an acquisition. Where one party acquires shares, units or assets from another, or where the JV structure confers the ability to exercise decisive influence over the target business, the ACCC may treat the transaction as functionally equivalent to a merger. This is true even where both parties characterise the arrangement commercially as a “partnership” or a “collaboration.” Industry observers expect this interpretive approach to capture a broader range of JV formations than many deal teams initially anticipated.
| Scenario | Notification likely required? | Key risk factor |
|---|---|---|
| Two automotive dealers form a 50/50 incorporated JV to operate a shared service centre; combined turnover exceeds thresholds | Yes, share acquisition conferring joint control | Joint control via equal board representation and mutual vetoes |
| Franchisor grants a master franchise right to a new JV partner with exclusive territory; thresholds not met | No, thresholds not met | Monitor for future step-ups or territory expansions that could trigger thresholds |
| Existing 30% JV partner exercises a call option to acquire 51%; thresholds met | Yes, step-up to majority control constitutes a new acquisition | Call exercise transfers decisive influence; separate notification required at the point of exercise |
The ACCC’s notification framework focuses on whether a transaction confers the ability to exercise decisive influence over a business or its assets. For joint ventures, this analysis extends well beyond simple majority shareholding. Board composition, reserved-matter vetoes, information-access covenants and even contractual exclusivity arrangements can all be relevant when assessing whether the merger notification thresholds are triggered.
Three primary forms of control are relevant to JV governance in Australia under the reformed regime:
The ACCC’s thresholds for notifying acquisitions are structured around combined Australian turnover, transaction value and asset value. Parties must assess these metrics at the time of each relevant acquisition event, including at the point of formation, at each step-up, and on exercise of any option or contingent right. The thresholds guidance published by the ACCC provides the current numerical benchmarks and calculation methodology.
| JV form | When it can trigger ACCC notification | Practical drafting flags |
|---|---|---|
| Incorporated JV company (share acquisition to JV vehicle) | Acquisition of shares or units giving decisive influence, treated as an acquisition; combined turnover test applies | Avoid share transfers that change control without clearance; limit reserved matters to non-strategic operational items; include step-up notice obligations |
| Unincorporated JV / contractual JV (rights-based) | If contractual rights grant decisive control over assets, customers or market entry, may be treated as acquisition of assets or rights | Draft limited-scope service or agency arrangements; avoid exclusive grants that transfer core assets or customer lists without ACCC assessment |
| Option / call / put / step-up arrangements | Execution or automatic vesting of an option or call that confers control can itself be a notifiable acquisition | Use delayed execution; require ACCC clearance as a condition precedent; stagger vesting with non-control milestones |
Every joint venture agreement in Australia should now be drafted, or reviewed, with ACCC notification risk as a standing item on the checklist. The clauses below represent the core provisions where drafting choices directly affect whether a transaction triggers mandatory merger notification, and how efficiently the parties can navigate the suspensory waiting period if notification is required.
Board composition and voting thresholds are the first indicators of control. Where one party holds board appointment rights that give it a casting vote or effective veto over strategic decisions, the ACCC may treat that party as having decisive influence. Drafting considerations include:
Reserved-matter clauses are standard in JV agreements but carry underappreciated ACCC risk. If one party holds a veto over pricing, capital expenditure, market entry, material contracts or competitive conduct, the ACCC may find that party exercises decisive influence, even where its shareholding is at or below 50 per cent.
A deadlock clause in a joint venture can itself create a notifiable acquisition if the resolution mechanism results in a transfer of shares, assets or control from one party to the other. This is one of the most commonly overlooked ACCC risk points in existing JV precedents. The likely practical effect of the reforms is that many standard deadlock buy-sell provisions will need to be restructured or made conditional on ACCC clearance.
Any provision that allows one party to increase its shareholding, acquire additional assets or assume greater control, whether through a call option, put option, milestone-based step-up or automatic vesting, must be assessed at the drafting stage for ACCC notification risk. Early indications suggest the ACCC will treat the exercise of such rights as a separate acquisition event, requiring its own notification and clearance if thresholds are met at that time.
Pre-emption rights, tag-along and drag-along provisions, and contractual put/call exit mechanics all have the potential to create notifiable acquisitions. When one party exits and the other acquires the departing party’s interest, particularly where that acquisition consolidates control, the transaction should be mapped against ACCC thresholds at the time of exercise.
Post-formation, JV partners will need to monitor ongoing compliance with ACCC merger control rules, particularly where the JV’s turnover grows over time or where incremental changes to governance rights are agreed. Practical clauses include:
Insolvency events are a common trigger for automatic share transfers, put/call rights or forced buy-outs in JV agreements. Where a party enters voluntary administration, liquidation or receivership, and the JV agreement provides for the solvent party to acquire the insolvent party’s interest, that transfer may constitute a notifiable acquisition.
The ACCC has signalled that it will scrutinise arrangements designed to circumvent mandatory notification. Drafting a joint venture agreement in Australia with artificial structural features intended to stay below thresholds, or splitting a single commercial arrangement into multiple sub-threshold transactions, is likely to attract regulatory attention.
Deadlock resolution is one of the most negotiated provisions in any joint venture agreement in Australia, and the 2026 ACCC reforms have added a new layer of complexity. Deal teams must now design escalation ladders that resolve genuine commercial impasses without inadvertently creating notifiable acquisitions at each rung.
Best practice is to structure deadlock resolution as a multi-step escalation, beginning with non-transfer mechanisms and reserving ownership-changing remedies for the final stage:
| Mechanism | Pros | Cons / ACCC risk |
|---|---|---|
| Senior executive negotiation | Fast, preserves relationship, no cost | No binding outcome; may delay resolution |
| Mediation | Confidential, flexible, no ACCC risk | Non-binding unless settlement reached |
| Expert determination | Binding on technical/valuation matters | Limited scope; may not resolve strategic disagreements |
| Independent chair / casting vote | Breaks board-level deadlock efficiently | Parties may resist ceding control to a third party |
| Buy-sell / shotgun | Definitive outcome; clean exit for one party | High ACCC risk, transfer of shares/control may require notification and clearance; completion delay possible |
| Winding-up / dissolution | Avoids forced inter-party transfer entirely | Destroys JV value; commercially undesirable in most cases |
Drafting tip: Where a buy-sell mechanism is commercially essential, include a clause providing that the buy-sell notice triggers an obligation on both parties to cooperate with an ACCC notification (if required), and that the transfer completion date is extended by the length of the ACCC review period. This preserves the commercial intent while managing regulatory risk.
Staged investment structures are common in infrastructure, energy, automotive and franchise joint ventures. A party may enter at 25 per cent, with contractual rights to increase to 51 per cent on achievement of revenue milestones, financing close or project approvals. Under the 2026 ACCC merger control regime, each step-up that crosses a control threshold can constitute a separate notifiable acquisition.
Model clause excerpt: “The Buyer’s obligation to complete the Step-Up Acquisition is conditional upon the ACCC having issued a clearance decision (or the applicable review period having expired without the ACCC issuing a notice of opposition) in respect of the Step-Up Acquisition. If ACCC clearance is required but has not been obtained by the Long-Stop Date, either party may terminate the Step-Up Notice by written notice to the other.”
The suspensory nature of the 2026 regime means that parties to a notifiable acquisition must not complete the transaction until the ACCC has issued clearance. The ACCC’s merger reform FAQs, dated 24 April 2026, confirm the procedural review timeframes and the process for seeking waivers in urgent or borderline cases. For joint venture deal teams, this has immediate commercial implications for signing-to-completion timelines, financing conditions and third-party approvals.
Failing to notify a notifiable acquisition, or completing before clearance (known as “gun-jumping”), exposes parties to serious consequences. The ACCC can seek injunctions to prevent or unwind the transaction, divestiture or structural remedies, and civil penalties. The financial and reputational cost of non-compliance far exceeds the administrative burden of a timely notification.
The ACCC’s mandatory merger notification regime affects joint ventures across all sectors, but two common structures, automotive dealership JVs and franchise network JVs, illustrate particularly important drafting challenges.
Fact pattern: Two regional automotive dealer groups form an incorporated JV to operate a shared parts distribution centre and co-brand a network of service locations. Each party contributes dealership assets (customer databases, workshop equipment, real property leases) and takes a 50 per cent shareholding. Combined Australian turnover exceeds ACCC thresholds.
Notification risk analysis: The share acquisition and asset contribution each confer joint control. The exclusive territory allocation and customer-database sharing create additional decisive-influence indicators. ACCC notification is likely required before completion.
Recommended drafting points:
Fact pattern: A franchisor enters a JV with a local operator to expand a food-service franchise network across two Australian states. The JV vehicle holds the master franchise rights; the franchisor retains brand control and a 40 per cent interest with step-up options to 60 per cent on revenue milestones. Combined turnover is below thresholds at formation but projected to exceed them within 18 months.
Notification risk analysis: At formation, thresholds are not met, no notification required. However, the step-up option to 60 per cent will confer decisive influence when exercised, and by that time combined turnover is projected to exceed thresholds. The option exercise will itself be a notifiable acquisition.
Recommended drafting points:
The 2026 ACCC merger reforms have permanently altered the risk landscape for every joint venture agreement in Australia. Deal teams that continue to use pre-reform JV precedents, particularly those with standard deadlock buy-sell provisions, automatic insolvency buy-outs or unconditional step-up options, face material notification, enforcement and penalty risk. The practical response is clear: review every live and pipeline JV against the ACCC’s current thresholds, restructure control and exit provisions to include ACCC clearance conditions, and engage with the ACCC early through pre-notification discussions where the transaction is complex or borderline.
By building ACCC merger control compliance into the joint venture agreement at the drafting stage, parties protect both the commercial objectives of the JV and their regulatory standing in an environment where mandatory notification is now the default.
This article was produced by Global Law Experts. For specialist advice on this topic, contact Louis Shivarev at TNS Lawyers, a member of the Global Law Experts network.
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